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Dynamic export growth has been a distinctive feature of the
Chilean economy over the last quarter of a century. This
strong performance, however, has been accompanied by only
modest average growth in GDP. Whilst export volumes rose
by 10% a year between 1974 and 2001, GDP growth was
only 4.3%. Furthermore, whereas export growth was steady,
GDP fluctuated greatly, with several episodes of 8% to 10%
growth but also deep recessions of 14% or 15%. Here we
shall look at the similarities and differences among three
episodes (1973-1982, 1983-1989 and 1990-1999), analyse
the interrelationship among export quality, the
macroeconomic environment and overall growth in Chile,
and touch on some challenges for the future.
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Dynamic export growth has been a distinctive feature
of the Chilean economy over the last quarter of a
century. With only the occasional reverse (the main one
being in the early 1980s), goods and services exports
have led economic growth and tended to rise as a
proportion of national output, increasing from 15% of
GDP in the 1970s to some 30% by the beginning of this
decade.
Dynamic exports, however, have been
accompanied by modest average GDP growth. Whilst
export volumes rose by 10% a year between 1974 and
2001, GDP growth averaged only 4.3%. Whereas export
growth has been quite steady, GDP has fluctuated
sharply, with episodes of 8% to 10% growth but also
deep recessions of 14% and 15%. These fluctuations
have had a significant effect on average economic
growth.
The pioneering trade liberalization carried out in
the 1970s, rapid export growth and the recovery in GDP
observed in the Chilean economy after the 1975 crisis
would seem to indicate that trade reform was a success.
The outcome is not so clear-cut, however. The pro-
import bias of the first trade reform brought in during
the 1970s, the currency appreciation that took place in
the second half of the decade and mistakes with the
sequencing and speed of the changes had led by the
early 1980s to a huge external deficit and to a situation
that was discouraging to exporters. Although the effects
were positive in the early years (Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
chapter III), by 1981 most exports were losing ground
in volume and value terms.
Following recovery from the 1982 debt crisis, a
changed framework led to a second surge in exports.
This context included a real exchange rate that
depreciated sharply during the 1980s, and proactive
public policies, including a new and more pragmatic
trade reform that reintroduced a degree of protection
for importables and incentives for non-traditional
exports. Then, in the 1990s, a third episode of export
dynamism was stimulated by a more comprehensive
policy that sought to combine the principles of an open
economy and selective integration with certain strategic
trading partners, particularly in Latin America, all this
taking place in a new environment characterized by high
levels of domestic investment and rising productivity
across the economy until 1998. In more recent years
(1999-2001) this tendency has been reversed to some
degree.
Several interesting studies of Chilean export
performance have come out recently.1 Here we shall
concentrate on the differences among the three episodes
(especially the second and third), the interrelationship
between that performance and overall growth in the
Chilean economy, and challenges for the future.
II
Trade policy in the 1980s:
a departure from neoliberal orthodoxy
In response to the deep recession of 1982, Chile was
obliged to adjust its policies to cope with severe external
constraints and stimulate domestic recovery. Thus, there
was a shift from a highly orthodox or neoliberal model,
implemented mainly in the 1970s and early 1980s, to a
more pragmatic approach, which included partial
reversal of some of the original reforms (Ffrench-Davis,
2002, chapter VI, and Moguillansky, 1999). In this new
context, the priority was to generate a trade surplus to
An abridged version of this article also appears in Ffrench-Davis
(2002). The author is grateful for the valuable research work done
by Heriberto Tapia and for the comments of Carla Macario.
1 See, for example, Agosin (2001); Meller and Sáez (1995); Meller
(1996) and Sachs, Larraín and Warner (1999).
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service the large external debt built up between 1977
and 1982. The strategy followed involved both reducing
imports and promoting exports, in three ways: an
increase in the uniform tariff from 10% to 35%, the
use of a battery of export promotion instruments
–notably a novel system of simplified drawback for
non-traditional exports, or subsidy of 10%– and an
active exchange-rate policy that sought to enhance the
external competitiveness of the Chilean economy and
its ability to generate foreign currency.
1. Export promotion and the second trade reform
Chile was the first Latin American country to carry out
across-the-board trade liberalization, and has been the
most consistent in applying it. In 1973, before the
reforms began, Chile’s external trade was subject to
heavy State intervention.2 In late 1973 a deep trade
reform was initiated. This included the abolition of all
non-tariff restrictions, rapid tariff reductions and
unification of the multiple exchange rates into a single
rate. Although it was not one of the programme’s
original goals, by June 1979 a low, uniform tariff of
10% had been established (Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
chapter III).
Table 1 shows how the average import tariff and
real exchange rate have moved over time.
In the first trade liberalization, large tariff cuts and
the dismantling of quantitative controls seem to have
had a powerful impact on export dynamism, by
reducing the cost of imported inputs (Agosin, 2001).
The starting point was a situation in which the great
majority of domestic prices for standard importables
(consumer and intermediate goods) were not tied to
international prices; as a result, the scope for reducing
costs by replacing domestic inputs with imports and
raising productivity was immense. By late 1973,
furthermore, there was significant underutilization of
installed capacity in the export sector, owing to the
marked distortions that then prevailed in the Chilean
economy. This was the main reason for the spectacular
growth of exports in 1974, which began sharply a few
months after the 1973 coup, along with very marked
diversification. However, because of the recessionary
environment in which the reform was carried out, its
abruptness, the behaviour of the exchange rate (which
appreciated sharply after 1975) and excessively high
interest rates (an average of 38% in real terms between
1975 and 1982), the dynamism of the export sector was
transmitted only very weakly to the rest of the economy.
Fixed productive investment was well below historical
norms, and the economy underwent a sharp de-
industrialization. Lastly, banks (and thus their lending)
suffered a spectacular crisis (Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
chapter II).
Abrupt trade liberalization, accompanied by
significant currency appreciation between the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s, resulted in a major external
imbalance that multiplied the effects of the highly
adverse external shocks associated with the Latin
American debt crisis. To cope with the domestic and
balance-of-payments crisis that struck Chile in 1982
(owing to a combination of economic policy errors and
2 This was the situation in 1973. A reform programme carried out
in the second half of the 1960s, however, included gradual
rationalization of the import regime, improvements to export
promotion mechanisms and systematic implementation of a policy
of mini-adjustments to the exchange rate (Ffrench-Davis, 1973).
This was the experiment that pioneered what John Williamson
would later dub the “crawling peg” system, later to evolve into the
system of “crawling bands”.
TABLE 1
Chile: Average tariff and real exchange rate,
1973-2001










Source: Central Bank of Chile and Ffrench-Davis (2001).
a Simple average, excluding exemptions and preferential
arrangements negotiated with Latin American countries and
Canada.
b Simple average. The nominal exchange rate was deflated by the
Chilean consumer price index (duly adjusted in 1973-1978) and
inflated by an external price index. This index was constructed
on the basis of the wholesale price index, weighted for the shares
in Chilean trade of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States from 1986 onward; it was obtained
from the Central Bank of Chile. For years up to 1985, the
information is taken from Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid
(1991), and includes France, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
c December 1973.
d Provisional figures for 2001.
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a threefold external shock3 that reduced aggregate
demand by 30% and GDP by 17% between 1981 and
1983), the currency was devalued on a number of
occasions from mid-1982 onward, then a crawling peg
was reintroduced. At the same time, the uniform tariff
was raised in stages to 35% by September 1984 (with
annual averages of 24% and 26% in 1984 and 1985,
respectively). Subsequently, as the acute shortage of
foreign exchange eased, the tariff was reduced in stages
to 30% in March 1985, 20% in June the same year,
15% in 1988 and 11% in mid-1991.
After the 1982 crisis, trade policy was modified in
a number of ways. The Government began to make
active use of antidumping measures to protect the
economy from unfair trading practices. For this purpose,
it raised the total tariff (the uniform tariff plus
countervailing surcharges) to a maximum of 35% –the
level bound by Chile in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1979– for imports that Chile
could prove were being dumped. A system of price
bands consistent with medium-term international prices
was introduced for three leading agricultural products
(wheat, sugar and oilseeds), which yielded significant
benefits for agriculture. Of course, it was also a
departure from the uniform tariff, although it was
viewed more as a price stabilization mechanism for the
imports affected. Where exports were concerned,
drawback systems were improved and a system of
simplified tax rebates was adopted for minor exports,
which qualified for reimbursement of up to 10% of their
value when the total value of all exports in the customs
item concerned did not exceed a certain yearly limit
(Macario, 2000). In 1996, according to information
from the Central Bank, 16% of exports benefited from
this incentive and the average drawback was 8.7% of
the value of these exports. Box 1 summarizes the main
export promotion mechanisms.
One of the most striking export initiatives was
developed by a semi-public foundation, Fundación
Chile. The early projects of the Foundation were mainly
focused on providing technical assistance to particular
sectors. Few got beyond the pilot stage, however. In
view of these problems, the Foundation decided to gain
experience by initiating business ventures itself. The
idea was to determine what activities could benefit from
new technologies, so that these could then be acquired
and adapted. Once a technology had been assimilated,
the Foundation would carry out commercial production,
with marketing to be conducted by a subsidiary. When
the subsidiary became profitable it would be sold off,
and the technology transfer process thereby completed.
One very successful example was salmon farming.
In 1981, the Foundation decided to conduct a pilot cage-
based freshwater salmon farming project. Commercial
production began in 1986-1987, and doubled the
following financial year. In 1988 the project went into
profit, and the transfer cycle was completed that year
when the Foundation sold it on to a Japanese fish and
shellfish company. The Foundation’s salmon farming
project gave a clear boost to salmon production in Chile,
and in the 1990s salmon became one of the country’s
main exports, and the leading non-traditional one
(ECLAC, 1998).
To sum up, a “second trade reform” began in 1983,
involving a mixture of restrictions, liberalization and
intervention (table 1). While the basic characteristics
of trade policy –the abolition of non-tariff barriers and
the adoption of a uniform tariff– had not changed since
1979, the tariff had risen back to quite a high level by
1984, and was now accompanied by antidumping
measures and price bands. In fact, the tariff averaged
20% in 1984-1989, double the average for 1979-1982.
The fundamental difference, however, lay in the fact
that during the first liberalization the exchange rate
appreciated progressively through the second half of
the 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1980s, on the other
hand, as the tariff was being cut from 35% in September
1984 to 15% in 1988, the currency underwent a large
real devaluation under the pressure of the debt crisis,
which sent out a powerful positive signal to exporters
while at the same time stimulating the production of
import-competing goods. Thus, in this second episode,
by contrast with the first, the output of importables also
recovered strongly, chiefly between 1984 and the late
1980s.
If conclusions are drawn about the different stages
of trade liberalization in Chile, it is clear that the net
results of the second reform were better than those of
the first (ECLAC, 1998, chapter V).
2. Exchange-rate policy
Exchange-rate policy has varied greatly. From 1976
onward, real exchange-rate appreciation was used
sporadically to anchor inflation (Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
chapter IV). This was because inflation remained
stubbornly high despite a deep recession that produced
a current-account surplus in 1976. Currency
3 Worsening terms of trade, higher interest rates on the external
debt and a sudden halt to lending by foreign banks (Ffrench-Davis,
2002, chapter VI).
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appreciation intensified in 1979 when the peso was set
at 39 to the dollar, a nominal parity that survived until
the mid-1982 crisis; during those years, very substantial
real appreciation took place. The currency crisis of 1982
was followed by some months of experimentation, with
a succession of policies being followed. In 1983 a
crawling peg was adopted again, and this policy was
maintained with some variations until 1999. Essentially,
the Central Bank set a reference price for the dollar in
the official market (called the “tipo de cambio acuerdo”
or TCA), with an initially small flotation band that was
widened every so often. The “official” exchange rate
was devalued each day in accordance with the
differential between domestic inflation and estimated
external inflation. One-off devaluations were also
carried out on a number of occasions, culminating in
the enormous real depreciation seen after the 1982 crisis
(130% between 1982 and 1988).
Because a number of exchange controls remained
in force for many years (except for a few weeks in 1982
when all exchange controls were lifted), an illegal (but
openly tolerated) parallel currency market operated.
This would be legalized as the “mercado cambiario
informal” (MCI) only in April 1990, by virtue of the
Central Bank independence act issued by Pinochet’s
Government at the very end of his 16 years in power.
In 1988, currency appreciation accompanied by tax
and tariff cuts (see the next section) reconciled lower
inflation with a strong economic recovery. By 1989 the
recovery was complete and the output gap between
actual GDP and potential GDP was closed (figure 1).4
This was due to a sharp increase in aggregate demand,
sustained by the tax cuts and currency appreciation
of 1988 and the fiscal revenue generated by a large
rise in the copper price in 1987-1989; between 1986
and 1988, the terms of trade improved by the
equivalent of 6% of GDP (according to the Central Bank
National Accounts, at 1986 prices). A large rise in
imports and the external deficit (if the current account
is recalculated using the “normalized” price of the
Copper Stabilization Fund) and a sharp pick-up in
inflation led the Central Bank to reverse previous
interest rate cuts.
In mid-1989, the flotation band against the dollar
was widened to ± 5%. The action of the Central Bank
was accompanied by a change in expectations in the
currency market, so that the exchange rate rapidly fell
to the bottom of the band. Thus, without too much
dislocation, a significant depreciation was achieved
without any change in the “official” exchange rate.
For a year or so, during which time democracy was
restored, presidential elections were held (in
December 1989) and president Aylwin took office (in
March 1990), the bank market rate (“dólar
observado”) remained at the bottom of the band, even
though in January 1990 macroeconomic adjustment
efforts were stepped up to check rapidly climbing
inflation, which had risen to 31% on an annualized
basis over the previous five months. The sole
adjustment measure taken was a sharp interest rate
rise, led by Central Bank 10-year paper, which was
offered at the high real annual rate of 9.7%.
Box 1
TAX INCENTIVES FOR EXPORTS BY THE LATE 1980S
– Exemption of exports from value-added tax (VAT) and reimbursement of taxes paid on inputs incorporated
into export products. This instrument was designed to avoid double taxation of final products or “tax
exporting” (Decree-Law 825, in force since 1974).
– Simplified tax rebates or drawback for minor exports (non-traditional products) involving refund of 10%
or 5% of the FOB value exported (Act 18.480, in force since 1985).
– Duty and VAT waiver for inputs imported for use in producing export goods on premises designated for that
purpose (Fiscal Decree 224, in force since 1986).
– Deferred payment of customs duties on imports of capital goods. This instrument is of general application
and is not exclusive to exporters (Act 18.634, in force since 1987).
– Rebate of customs duties paid on imported inputs incorporated into export products (Act 18.700, in force
since 1988).
Source: Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid (1991) and Macario (2000).
4 See Ffrench-Davis (2002, chapter I).
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III
Trade policy since 1990
The economic team that took over in 1990 stuck to the
basic principles of the previous trade policy.5 The main
exception was the decision to sign trade agreements
with a number of partners, mainly in Latin America.
The economy remained open to trade and a uniform
import tariff for the rest of the world was retained. The
rate of 11% that applied in 1991 was kept unchanged
until 1999, when it began to be gradually reduced with
a view to bringing it down to 6% after five years, in
2003. In a significant “reform of the reforms”, however,
macroeconomic policies were altered substantially
(Ffrench-Davis, 2002, chapters I and IX). The most
important outcome was vigorous export expansion, now
achieved in tandem with dynamic GDP growth.
1. Towards a “reciprocated” policy
Without a doubt, the most outstanding feature of
Chilean trade policy in the 1990s was the search for
5 The new approach was consistent with the documented criticism
of the shortcomings recorded in the liberalization process, which
had led to the sharp de-industrialization of the 1970s and to
numerous bankruptcies, but it was also compatible with an
awareness that neoliberal reform had begun 16 years previously
and culminated in 1979. This was now a given, and there was no
question of starting afresh. In Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1998)
we put forward some proposals for “reforming the reforms” to trade
and productive development in Chile.
FIGURE 1
Chile: Actual and potential GDP per capita, 1974-2001
(1974 per capita GDP = 100)
Per capita GDP growth
(annual averages)
1974-89 1990-98 1999-2001
Potential GDP 2.4% 6.9% 4.8%
Actual GDP 2.9% 6.7% 2.4%
Potential GDP Actual GDP
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arrangements to expand the country’s access to new
export markets. The new domestic political scene
opened the way for a marked shift in Chile’s position,
away from an across-the-board, unilateral approach to
liberalization informed by a preference for neutral
policies and an arm’s length attitude to Latin America,
and towards a strategy that included preferential free
trade agreements subject to reciprocity (with many
countries in the region, in the event) and more active
promotion policies.
Since by that time the Chilean economy was
already highly open to trade, it was judged that in a
world where trading areas and economic blocs were
becoming increasingly important, the benefits of further
unilateral liberalization would be small (Ffrench-Davis,
1999, chapter VIII.1). Progress towards economic
integration in Latin America was envisaged as a form
of open regionalism.
In pursuit of an active policy, economic
complementation agreements were signed with Andean
Community countries, i.e., Bolivia (1993), Venezuela
(1993), Colombia (1994), Ecuador (1995) and Peru
(1998), and with the Central American Common Market
(1999). In the case of the Southern Common Market
(Mercosur), the main market in Latin America that
includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, an
agreement was signed in 1996, stipulating that a free
trade area would be in operation by 2004.
Far-reaching integration was achieved with Mexico
(1991 and 1999) and Canada (1997), thanks to quite
comprehensive free trade agreements. For example, the
agreement with Canada contains a special clause allowing
Chile to apply capital controls, particularly the reserve
requirement which Chile established in 1991 to moderate
the large inflow of funds recorded then and shift their
composition away from short-term and volatile flows.
Stronger links with other regions were another
ingredient in Chile’s international policy. This resulted
in negotiations with the European Union, the United
States and Asia-Pacific countries.
Domestically, trade policy in the 1990s had to deal
with a situation quite different from the previous
decade’s. Successive GATT negotiating rounds and the
rules subsequently laid down by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) restricted the use of export subsidies
in developing countries. Consequently, the use of
simplified tax drawback schemes and deferred payment
of customs duties on imported capital goods,
instruments that had proved highly effective and
efficient in the 1980s and early 1990s, was heavily
restricted and is due to be discontinued by January 2003.
In the 1990s, then, the authorities’ export
development efforts largely centred on ways of
correcting some market distortions more directly. The
main programme, administered by the national export
promotion body (ProChile), supplies information to
potential exporters and supports activities to promote
Chilean products in new markets. These policies were
successful in facilitating market access for participating
firms (Alvarez and Crespi, 2000), but they were far from
being as vigorous as the rather unorthodox exporting
strategy of the 1980s (including simplified drawback
and incentives such as debt-equity swaps with an
implicit subsidy of 46%).6 This was certainly given a
decisive boost by the real devaluation of 130%. This
devaluation was prompted, or forced, by the acute
external debt crisis and the consequent need to
“produce” dollars by exporting and “save” dollars by
substituting imports or producing importable tradables.
2. Exchange-rate policy and the new capital surge
For most of the 1990s the crawling peg system was
maintained, but with much more active intervention.
As in other Latin American and emerging countries,
the Chilean authorities had to cope with a sharp
resurgence of private-sector capital inflows which
pushed exchange-rate policy decisively in the opposite
direction from the 1980s, when the pressure was
towards depreciation. Owing to the scale of these
inflows, the real exchange rate in Chile tended to
appreciate during the first half of the decade (see
figure 2 and Ffrench-Davis, 2002, chapter IX).
However, the effective appreciation was significantly
less than in other countries; furthermore, the fact that
Chile was emerging from the severe external debt crisis
of the 1980s meant there was room for appreciation
since, up to a point, this represented movement towards
equilibrium rather than away from it.
Broadly speaking, the moderate level of the
current-account deficit in the first half of the 1990s
indicates that the appreciation really did represent a
movement towards equilibrium; this is consistent with
net productivity increases and the improvement in
external debt conditions. The external deficit actually
averaged just 2.5% of GDP in 1990-1995, by comparison
with the 8% seen in Mexico prior to the “Tequila” crisis.
6 This refers to the so-called “chapter XIX”, which operated in
Chile between 1985 and 1991 with large implicit subsidies for those
foreign investors bringing Chilean external debt paper (see Ffrench-
Davis, 2002, chapter VII).
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In Chile, significant changes were made to
exchange-rate policy to counter the tendency towards
appreciation; thus, after being linked only to the United
States dollar, the exchange rate was tied to a basket of
currencies with a view to discouraging speculative
capital flows, most of which were in dollars, and the
Central Bank became actively involved in the currency
market, where its activities included intra-margin
intervention (within the band). Taxes and reserve
requirements were also imposed on external credits and
foreign-currency deposits, the idea being to increase
their cost in the domestic market and thereby dampen
the supply of currency being generated by the capital
surge and reduce the share of short-term flows.
Defending the exporting model was an explicit objective
of this effort to avoid excessive real currency
appreciation and instability (Zahler, 1998).
Prudential macroeconomic policies lost some of
their effectiveness in the second half of the decade,
when the Central Bank failed to react forcefully and
quickly enough to a massive new capital inflow. Flows
into Latin America rose substantially in 1996-1997, and
this overabundance was felt particularly in Chile. In
the face of this, the Central Bank choose to keep cost
restrictions (the reserve requirement) at existing levels.
As a result, the Chilean foreign-exchange and credit
markets were flooded by funds to a greater extent than
in 1990-1994. The reserve requirement was generally
paid, but it was less than the returns expected from
investing in Chile. Thus, excess supply built up in the
Chilean market. The scale of outside flows resulted in
a real appreciation of 16% between 1995 and October
1997 and in a rise in the external deficit, which peaked
at 5.7% of GDP in the 1996-1997 biennium. To maintain
the equilibria of the real macroeconomy, the natural
response would have been to raise the reserve
requirement (Le Fort and Lehmann, 2000).
Thus, when the Asian crisis hit Chile, the exchange
rate was overvalued. The expectation of an imminent
devaluation triggered further capital flight, with all the
downward pressure on the currency this entailed. The
Central Bank resisted this pressure by narrowing the
band and raising interest rates, until in September 1999
it decided to let the currency float freely. This change
made it possible for the real exchange rate to begin a
sharp adjustment from its hitherto very overvalued level,
but subsequently it also meant greater volatility.7
7 Caballero and Corbo (1989) have shown empirically that real
exchange-rate volatility has highly negative effects on export
performance.
FIGURE 2
Chile: Real exchange rate, 1974-2001
(1974 = 100)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, ECLAC and Ffrench-Davis (2002, figure IX.3). The main difference between the two indicators is that ECLAC
uses the consumer price index to measure external inflation and the Central Bank uses wholesale prices. The first method is more consistent
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Since the 1970s, two cycles in Chilean export growth
can be distinguished. As table 2 shows, these represent
a step-change from the historical trend. The first cycle
lasted from 1974 until the late 1970s. In eight years,
export volume growth averaged 9% a year, but the rate
for non-copper exports was 16%.8 In the early 1980s
total and manufactured exports stagnated, owing to the
substantial real currency appreciation that took place
in Chile and to the cooling of the world economy. Thus,
in 1981 export volumes fell by 3%, dragged down by a
fall of 7% in non-copper exports (Sáez, 1991).
The second cycle of rapid export growth began
after 1982, when the real exchange rate underwent a
sharp devaluation. Table 2 shows that in the second half
of the decade, the slow growth of copper export volumes
was compensated by the spectacular rise in other export
categories. The volume of traditional exports other than
copper grew by 9% a year over the four-year period
1986-1989, but it was non-traditional exports that
showed the greatest dynamism, with shipments
expanding by 22% a year.
Export volumes continued to rise vigorously in the
1990s, at an annual average of 9% (1990-2001). This
is basically accounted for by the performance of non-
traditional exports, which grew by 13% a year, while
shipments of copper and other traditional products
increased by 9% and 5%, respectively. The value of
primary commodity exports did not change much in
the first half of the 1990s, owing to the decline in the
copper price. In 1994-1995, prices for the main exports
picked up sharply, which contributed to the vigorous
growth they displayed over the biennium. This boom
was cut short by the Asian crisis, which struck the
economies of Latin America in 1998-1999, causing a
negative terms of trade shock so that the value of
exports, particularly traditional ones, fell substantially.
The index of unit export prices fell by 9% over the
biennium. The instability of export prices (and of the
terms of trade) is one of the drawbacks affecting this
variable of such key importance to economic
development in Chile.
There is another disturbing factor that deserves
closer consideration. While growth in the physical
volume of non-traditional exports has been exceptional,
this dynamism has gradually being falling away: growth
averaged 22% a year in 1986-1989, 16% in 1990-1995
and 10% in 1996-2001 (table 2, p. 144). Consequently,
the volume growth of these exports has tended to
converge, perhaps prematurely, with the average volume
growth of total exports (figure 3, p.145). Slower growth
in traditional exports other than copper during 1996-
2001 was offset by the dynamism of copper exports,
whose physical volume increased at an annual rate of
12% (15% in 1995-1999). As Moguillansky (1999) and
Sachs, Larraín and Warner (1999) document, however,
these very impressive growth rates appear to be
unsustainable, both because investment is falling and
because there are external markets in which Chile has
become a “major” exporter in a number of categories.
The real currency appreciation that occurred in the
second half of the 1990s, and its impact on the
competitiveness of the export sector, seems to be the
main reason for the slackening of non-traditional export
growth (Díaz and Ramos, 1998). This hypothesis is
given support by the econometric estimates of
Moguillansky and Titelman (1993) for the price-
elasticity of Chile’s export supply in different industries.
These authors conclude that the effects of variations in
the real exchange rate differ depending on the type of
goods being exported, and that a systematic real
depreciation (appreciation) tends to have a positive
(negative) impact on volume and on diversification into
greater value-added. Thus, depreciation of the currency
followed by stability at the new rate is likely to prove
an incentive for investment in tradables and export
diversification.
In the 1990s, the pattern of trade growth was greatly
influenced by foreign direct investment (FDI), which
affects both exporting capacity and the exchange rate.
In fact, FDI has made a major contribution to export
development in Chile. In the period 1990-2000, it is
conservatively estimated that about 30% of the
resources invested in tradables were channelled through
8 It is interesting to note the spectacular rise in exports in 1974,
reflecting very considerable underutilization of export capacity the
year before. Export volume rose by 38% in 1974, then by 7% a
year on average in 1975-1980, before falling in 1981.
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FDI, the main destination being copper production.9 This
large contribution to export capacity was eroded,
however, in the second half of the decade. In 1990-
1995, FDI in export sectors accounted for 75% of total
FDI flows. In 1996-2000, however, the share was down
to 35% (ECLAC, 2001).10
The declining share of FDI in tradables production
was offset by the sharp rise in total FDI. Larger flows,
on top of higher portfolio inflows during those years,
were partly responsible for the overvaluation of the peso
in 1996-1997.11 This process not only had negative
macroeconomic effects (see Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
chapter IX), but was detrimental to production as well,
owing to the spread of so-called “Dutch disease” in
most export sectors, particularly non-traditional ones
which, as has now been documented, react more
elastically to the level and stability of the real exchange
rate. All this is consistent with the surge in copper export
volumes and the slackening of other exports. It
highlights the importance of having a broader set of
policies to ensure sound export development.
2. Export composition
Chilean exports have been diversifying in recent
decades, but they are still natural resource-intensive.
The share of copper exports in the total fell from 70%
in 1970 to about 45% by the early 1980s, and stayed at
around this level until the 1990s, when it fell below
40%.12 This decline is partly explained by the fall in
the copper price during the first half of the 1990s, and
the more rapid drop seen in recent years. Meanwhile,
the trend towards diversification can also be observed
in the number of products sold abroad, which increased
from 200 in 1970 to 2,800 in 1990 and about 3,900 in
1996, before stabilizing at that level. Something similar
happened with the number of exporters, which rose
spectacularly until the mid-1990s before settling at
about 6,000.
Traditional exports other than copper –consisting
of fresh fruit and natural resource-based manufactures,
including fishmeal, cellulose and paper– increased
substantially in the 1970s, jumping from 24% to 40%
of total goods exports between 1970 and 1979. In the
early 1980s the real value of these exports fell off, owing
to the detrimental effects of currency appreciation, and
over the decade their share fell to a third of the export
total. In 1987 they began to increase again in real terms,
although more slowly than other exports, and with large
fluctuations. As a result, by the end of the 1990s their
share was less than 30%.
Non-traditional exports –a category which includes
non-natural resource-based manufactures and new
products based on non-traditional natural resources–
initially grew very strongly during the first trade reform.
TABLE 2
Chile: Export volume growth, 1961-2001
1961-1970 1971-1973 1974-1985 1986-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001
Copper 3.9 -2.3 5.0 3.3 6.5 11.4
Non-copper 7.8 -8.5 15.8 13.1 11.2 7.0
Traditional 9.0 7.7 2.9
Non-traditional 21.7 15.2 10.3
Total exports 4.9 -4.5 9.3 8.8 9.2 8.8
Source: Sáez (1991) for 1960-1985 and Central Bank of Chile for 1985-2001. Exports FOB.
9 However, the domestic value-added in this copper output is
notably lower than that of the State enterprise Codelco, because
privately produced copper is less highly processed and effective
taxes on profits are very low.
10 In addition, a large percentage of FDI in the latter part of the
1990s went into mergers and acquisitions of existing assets,
operations that did not directly result in the creation of new
productive capacity. This is borne out by the contrast between huge
FDI inflows –some US$ 17 billion in 1999-2001, or 8.4% of GDP,
the highest since figures became available– and the declining
growth rate of potential GDP (4.8%) and actual GDP (2.4%).
11 In those years proposals were made for rationing FDI in copper
production by an auctioning process. The idea was to reduce the
inflow (thus checking currency appreciation), moderate the
downward pressure on the future price of copper and capture some
of the economic rent from reserves, which were taxed only lightly
and without regard to the quality of the natural resource (Agosin
and Ffrench-Davis, 1998).
12 During the 1980s the copper production costs of most of the
world’s major mining companies fell substantially. For this reason,
the “normal price” expected for the metal over the years that
followed tended to be much lower than in previous decades (Bande
and Ffrench-Davis, 1989, and Vial, 1988).
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Their share increased from less than 10% in 1970 to
about 20% in the second half of the decade, but then it
fell off in the early 1980s, actually decreasing
substantially in 1981. As already noted, from the mid-
1980s this group saw vigorous, sustained growth again,
so that its share rose to 35% in the second half of the
1990s, matching the value of copper exports towards
the end of the decade.
Table 3, p. 146, shows the geographical distribution
by value of Chilean exports, broken down by
technology content, over the last three decades. The
technology classification, which is based on ECLAC
(1992), groups products into three categories:
unprocessed commodities (line a), which are natural
resources with little value added; semi-processed
commodities (line b), which are natural resources that
have been subjected to some degree of processing, and
manufactured products (line c), encompassing
technologically more complex goods.
The first column of the table shows that, despite
the diversification of recent years, and notwithstanding
the tendency to export more highly processed goods,
Chilean sales abroad continue to rely heavily on natural
resources. In fact, even non-traditional exports include
a large share of goods that are intensive in such
resources (line b). The table reveals that the share of
natural resource-based exports in the total was more
than 85% in 1998. This is not surprising when it is
considered that Chile is endowed with rich natural
resources plus geographical factors generating natural
comparative advantages that are highly static. It is for
this reason, though, that prices for Chilean exports are
so unstable, and demand so sluggish. The table also
shows that no vigorous or systematic enough effort has
been made to achieve a more substantial shift in the
country’s export profile.
3. Diversification of destination markets
Exports have diversified in terms not only of products,
but of destination markets as well. The number of
markets rose from 31 in 1970 to 120 in 1987 and 174
in 1999. The European Union has traditionally been
the largest destination for Chilean exports. In 1970, for
example, 61% of exports went to Europe (table 3,
line d).
After the first trade liberalization the geographical
distribution of exports changed, mainly owing to the
increasing importance of the Latin American and North
American markets, which cut into the European Union
FIGURE 3
Chile: Value of goods exports, 1970-1998
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Source: Author’s calculations based on BADECEL. The series were deflated by an external price index relevant to Chile.
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TABLE 3
Chile: Geographical distribution of exports by
technology content, 1970-1998
Year Product type Composition Geographical distribution (%)
(% of total) Latin European United Japan Asia Others
America Union States
1970 a) Non-processed commodities 12.9 10.6 33.0 14.9 39.8 0.1 1.6
b) Semi-processed commodities 84.5 10.3 67.1 14.2 7.8 0.4 0.2
c) Manufactures 2.2 62.6 2.2 10.1 13.0 1.0 11.1
d) Total 100.0 11.5 61.1 14.1 12.1 0.4 0.8
1983 a) Non-processed commodities 27.2 9.2 25.0 26.7 25.7 8.4 5.0
b) Semi-processed commodities 66.8 11.3 43.1 27.8 3.1 7.7 7.0
c) Manufactures 6.0 33.2 17.1 35.7 2.3 4.1 7.6
d) Total 100.0 12.0 36.6 28.0 9.2 7.7 6.5
1989 a) Non-processed commodities 26.3 13.2 27.4 20.9 19.3 15.4 3.8
b) Semi-processed commodities 66.3 10.8 43.6 14.2 12.7 13.5 5.2
c) Manufactures 7.5 21.2 20.2 36.8 3.6 3.5 14.7
d) Total 100.0 12.2 37.6 17.7 13.7 13.2 5.6
1998 a) Non-processed commodities 30.5 17.2 19.1 21.8 27.4 11.4 3.1
b) Semi-processed commodities 55.5 19.4 36.0 13.1 10.0 18.7 2.8
c) Manufactures 14.0 55.7 17.3 14.2 0.6 1.1 11.1
d) Total 100.0 23.8 28.2 15.9 14.0 14.0 4.1
Source: Prepared by the author using BADECEL data. Figures in current dollars, classified in accordance with ECLAC (1992) and Benavente
(2001).
share. The severe effects of the debt crisis on Latin
America reversed that tendency, so that the share of
Chilean exports taken by the region fell to 12% in 1983.
In that same year, the United States absorbed 28%,
while the share of the European Union fell to 37% and
Asian countries other than Japan emerged as important
trading partners, their share rising from close to zero
to 8%. By the end of the military dictatorship, in 1989,
the share taken by United States markets had slipped
to 18%, with an offsetting rise to 27% in the share going
to Asian destinations.
In the 1990s, the share of United States markets
held steady while that of the European Union declined,
although it remained the largest destination in 1998.
Asian markets continued to grow in importance, and in
1997 their share of Chilean exports (almost exclusively
natural resources) peaked at 35%, making them the
largest destination. This growth in the share taken by
Asian markets was reversed in 1998, owing to the crisis
that originated in that region. The collapse of Asian
markets, whose share fell by seven percentage points,
is one of the factors accounting for the severe drop in
Chile’s export total in 1998-1999. Exports to Latin
American countries rose vigorously, thanks to the
implementation of free trade agreements covering most
of the region’s markets, an upsurge in economic activity
and the real appreciation of their currencies in relation
to other parts of the world. As a result, the share of
regional markets had risen to 24% by 1998, just before
the Asian contagion reached Latin America.
The composition of Chilean exports differs greatly
by geographical destination. The figures in table 3 show
that exports to industrialized countries are much more
dominated by processed and unprocessed natural
resources than are exports to markets in the region. The
contrast is marked: in 1998, manufactures accounted
for 56% of all Chilean exports to Latin America (a
considerable increase on the 21% recorded in 1989),
but for only 17% of Chilean exports to the European
Union, 14% of those to the United States and 2% of
those to Asia. The huge importance of Latin American
markets as a destination for manufactures could be
crucial for future progress with the volume and quality
of Chilean exports. As was mentioned earlier, these
markets have been highly dynamic, their share doubling
between 1989 and 1998.
Within the region, Mercosur is Chile’s main trading
partner. The share of this market in Chile’s total exports
to Latin America declined during the 1990s.
Nonetheless, the share of manufacturing exports going
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there rose from about 40% in the 1980s to about 50%
in the 1990s, which is indicative of the strategic
importance of Mercosur for export diversification and
upgrading. As regards the other markets of Latin
America, the most dynamic one is Mexico, which is
taking an increasing share of both total and
manufactured exports.
Thus, the countries of Latin America are playing
an increasingly important role in raising the share of
manufactures and services in Chile’s export
diversification process. This development is closely
bound up with trade liberalization in the region,
including regional integration agreements.
Despite this, questions remain about the
sustainability of Chilean manufacturing export growth.
Much of the demand for these products still depends
on the performance of the region’s economies, on
macroeconomic stability, and on the maintenance of
exchange rates favourable to intraregional trade. In
addition, the process will only remain dynamic if
productive capacity is increased in activities that are
more intensive in value-added and innovation.
V
Exports and growth
It has often been asserted that exports are the engine of
the Chilean economy. The growth of exports as a share
of GDP is obviously a channel for the transmission of
externalities deriving from the exposure of local
companies to markets abroad. The incidence of these
is difficult to quantify, however, and little research has
been done.13 Again, the crowding-in effect of exports
depends on the way they feed back into the national
economy.14 Progress has unquestionably been made in
recent decades, as natural advantages have been
supplemented by the development of dynamic
competitive advantages, many of them based on natural
resources, with the emergence of clusters specializing
in forestry products, wine, salmon and fresh fruit. Some
analysts believe that these successes could help provide
the basis for a “Nordic” development strategy in Chile,
whereby value is added to natural resources directly or
by services, inputs and capital goods associated with
them (Díaz and Ramos, 1998).
There are several arguments for further
diversification into more highly processed goods and
services, and against passive acceptance of an export
profile dominated by products that only make intensive
use of natural resources. There are four important
reasons to diversify further with a view to adding more
value. Firstly, the fact that primary commodities still
make up a large percentage of Chilean exports means
that the economy as a whole is still highly vulnerable
to the large, unpredictable swings to which raw material
prices are always subject. Secondly, there is a limit to
how dynamic these products can be in the long term,
and this could have adverse consequences for future
growth in the economy as a whole (Sachs, Larraín and
Warner, 1999). Thirdly, diversification would rapidly
feed back into positive effects for the rest of the
economy (greater correlation or linkages between
exports and the other components of GDP). Fourthly,
production of more highly processed goods would bring
positive externalities for the rest of the economy in the
medium term, owing to the “learning by doing” effect
and to the benefits that accrue when dynamic
competitive advantages are secured (ECLAC, 1998,
chapters III and IV).
Here we shall concentrate on another relationship,
the influence of domestic policies –mainly the shifting
macroeconomic environment– on the association
between the performance of exports and the other
components of GDP.
The correlation between export growth and real
GDP has actually been high since the recovery from the
debt crisis, in the 1990s. There was also a strong
association in the recovery periods that followed the
1975 and 1982 crises (Meller, 1996). In those periods,
the export sector was one of the most dynamic in the
economy. This dynamism was accompanied in the
13 See Macario (2000) for a pioneering analysis covering Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
14 Another very important variable is the limited share of GDP
represented by exports. At late 1990s prices, gross goods and
services exports represented less than 30% of GDP. If this figure is
adjusted for the imported component of exports, their net value
falls to between 21% and 24% of GDP. Thus, a rapid rise in exports
–of 12% a year, say, as in East Asia– provides a growth floor of
less than 3%.
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1970s and 1980s by a recovery in GDP, while in the
1990s Chile’s productive capacity expanded strongly
as the country embarked on the longest period of
sustained growth in its history. In all episodes, export
volumes grew much more quickly than GDP (table 4).
Most econometric studies that have examined the issue
have found a clear positive association between exports
(particularly non-copper exports) and GDP growth.15
It is important to distinguish, however, between
an effect that reactivates aggregate demand and an effect
that generates new productive capacity. To concentrate
on the latter, table 4 breaks down the last few decades
into periods bracketed by years of peak utilization of
productive capacity, in 1974, 1981, 1989 and 1997-
1998. To repeat something that is often forgotten, a
sector can only really become a growth engine if its
expansion feeds back into the creation of new
productive capacity in the rest of the economy,
something that was only recorded in the 1990s.
As has been pointed out, the external debt crisis
and the automatic adjustment that resulted from it led
to a decline in output across the board in 1982-1983,
with GDP falling by some 14%. In this process, the
application of policies to restrain demand resulted in a
high degree of productive capacity underutilization.
Because the currency was devalued so much,
stimulating output of exportables and importables, this
underutilization was naturally concentrated mainly in
non-tradable goods and services.
The export promotion measures taken during the
1980s, summarized earlier, acted as supply switching
policies, reallocating available resources among sectors
at a time when the total investment rate was very low
(and thus new capacity creation was weak overall).
Depressed domestic demand, and the increased
profitability of exports that resulted from currency
depreciation, generated incentives to invest in and
produce tradables. As a result, there was no export-led
growth that decade, but rather an export surge deriving
from the combination of binding external constraints
and a recessionary internal adjustment. The vigorous
growth of exports, which averaged 8% a year in the
period 1982-1989, obviously helped to revive economic
activity. It was not enough, however, to make up for
the virtual stagnation of non-export GDP, which rose
by a mere 1.1% a year at a time when the population
was growing at 1.6%. Exports were therefore unable
to transmit their dynamism to total GDP, which grew by
just 2.6% a year (table 4). This very modest outcome
can be explained by the fact that goods and services
exports are responsible for less than a quarter of total
value-added, or GDP.
In the 1990s it was a different story. The capital
formation ratio rose to unprecedented levels, surging
not just in the export sector but in non-exports as well.
The gross fixed capital investment ratio rose from 18%
in 1982-1989 to 28% in 1990-2000. Output in non-
tradable sectors grew at much higher rates than in the
1970s and 1980s. In 1990-1997, for example, growth
in infrastructure works and telecommunications was
18% and 32%, respectively (Moguillansky, 1999).16
At the same time, exports remained dynamic even
though the real exchange rate appreciated, particularly
in 1995-1998 (figure 2). Three factors contributed to
this positive outcome. Firstly, world trade was more
vigorous. In 1980-1989, the volume of world trade had
grown at an annual rate of 3.7%, but in 1990-1999 the
rate was 6.2%. Secondly, Chile secured preferential
access to new markets under a variety of trade
agreements. Thirdly, the unprecedented rate of
productive investment recorded in the period provided
the basis for considerable improvements in labour
productivity and external competitiveness. Other things
also need to be borne in mind. The bulk of the moderate
currency appreciation that occurred during the first half
of the 1990s was an equilibrating adjustment after the
currency drought of the 1980s. In addition, genuinely
active policies were applied during those years to
enhance export development through prudential
management of the capital account and the
macroeconomy in general.17 As a result, actual growth
in total GDP in the 1990s was associated with dynamism
in both tradable and non-tradable sectors. In fact,
exports and other components of GDP grew by 9.3%
and 5.1% a year, respectively, in the period 1990-
2000.18 Together with full utilization of productive
capacity (figure 1), macroeconomic stability and
prudential management, this accounts for the rapid rate
of growth in the Chilean economy for much of the
decade.
15 See Agosin (2001), Coeymans (1999) and Meller (1996).
16 These figures should be compared with annual growth of 2.6%
for infrastructure in 1982-1989.
17 See Ffrench-Davis (2002, chapter IX), Ffrench-Davis, Agosin
and Uthoff (1995) and Zahler (1998).
18 Figures based on table 4. The averages given in the text include
the full employment years from 1991-1997 and the slowdown years
of 1990 and 1998-2000. As 2000 was a year with a recessionary
gap, potential non-export GDP growth in 1990-2000 was 6.3% a
year, i.e., higher than the actual non-export GDP growth rate of 5.1%.
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In the second half of the 1990s, however, the real
exchange rate appreciated too much owing to a large
capital influx that outstripped the ability of the economy
to absorb it efficiently and sustainably. As a result, resource
allocation was distorted and the external deficit widened
excessively, so that in 1996-1998 it was more than twice
as large as it had been in 1990-1995. Consequently, there
was also some over-investment in non-tradable sectors
(particularly construction and trade), while production of
tradables (particularly manufactures) fell off.
Thus, the achievements of most of the 1990s, when
high export growth was combined with solid expansion
of other components of GDP, were reversed. The reasons
for this included the severe external shocks experienced
by Chile from 1998 onward and the handling of the
real macroeconomy, which was more neutral and
passive than it had been in previous years. These two
factors produced the recessionary macroeconomic
environment in which companies had to operate from
1998 onward (figure 1).
TABLE 4
Chile: Exports and economic growth, 1960-2001
GDP Export Non-export Exports/GDP Exports/GDP
growth growtha GDP growthb (constant prices) (current prices)
1960-1970 4.2 3.6 4.3 11.9 14.0
1971-1973 0.5 -4.1 0.9 9.9 11.8
1974-1981 3.3 13.6 1.5 20.7 21.8
1982-1989 2.6 7.8 1.1 28.3 28.3
1990-1994 7.3 10.0 6.3 34.6 31.0
1995-1998 7.3 9.5 6.4 37.7 28.4
1999-2001 2.4 7.3 0.0 43.3 31.4
Source: Based on official figures from the Central Bank of Chile at constant prices. Exports include goods and non-financial services.
a Discrepancies with table 2 figures are due to differences in sources and methodology.
b Non-export GDP equals total GDP minus the domestic content, that is the value-added, in exports. The share of imported inputs in the gross
export total was assumed to be equal to imports of intermediate and capital goods as a share of GDP.
VI
Concluding remarks
To sum up, the last three decades have been a period of
exceptional export growth in Chile. During the second
and third of these decades this remarkable performance
was associated with unorthodox, quite active policies that
sought to keep the exchange rate competitive and
generate export capacity rather than confining themselves
solely to orthodox economic reform, as happened in the
1970s with unilateral trade liberalization.
Four mutually reinforcing sets of factors seem to
be most important in explaining the dynamic
performance of Chilean exports. First, a depreciated
real exchange rate is a factor of proven importance for
the overall path of exports. Second, diversification into
goods and services with greater value-added is crucial
for improving the quality of exports, as it: i) gives access
to more dynamic demand and higher international
prices, and ii) strengthens the links between exports
and the domestic economy. Important instruments for
this purpose are a stable and rather depreciated real
exchange rate, incentives such as simplified drawback
of duties for non-traditional exports, and intraregional
integration. Third, although this is beyond the scope of
the present article, a vigorous national effort is needed
to “complete” domestic technology and labour training
markets and the long-term segments of the capital
market if export quality is to be raised. Fourth, the
export drive needs to be complemented by a sustainable
domestic macroeconomic environment in which actual
output is close to potential GDP and key macroeconomic
prices are appropriate and conducive to productive
development, so that export-led growth can emerge.
This was the decisive factor underlying the positive
association between export dynamism and sustained
GDP growth in Chile for much of the 1990s.
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